To provide high dependability in a multithreaded system despite hardware faults, the system must detect and correct errors in its shared memory system. Recent research has explored dynamic checking of cache coherence as a comprehensive approach to memory system error detection. However, existing coherence checkers are costly to implement, incur high interconnection network traffic overhead, and do not scale well. In this paper, we describe the Token Coherence Signature Checker (TCSC), which provides comprehensive, low-cost, scalable coherence checking by maintaining signatures that represent recent histories of coherence events at all nodes (cache and memory controllers). Periodically, these signatures are sent to a verifier to determine if an error occurred. TCSC has a small constant hardware cost per node, independent of cache and memory size and the number of nodes. TCSC's interconnect bandwidth overhead has a constant upper bound and never exceeds 7% in our experiments. TCSC has negligible impact on system performance.
Introduction
Two trends motivate increased interest in fault tolerance for multithreaded shared-memory computer architectures. First, multithreaded systems including traditional multiprocessors, chip multiprocessors, and simultaneously multithreaded processors have come to dominate the commodity computing market. Second, the industrial roadmap [7] and recent research [17] forecast increases in hardware error rates due to decreasing transistor sizes and voltages. For example, smaller devices are more susceptible to having their charges disrupted by alpha particles or cosmic radiation [21] .
Many researchers have developed effective fault tolerance measures for microprocessor cores, using techniques such as redundant multithreading [16, 15, 20] and DIVA [2] . However, to provide fault tolerance in a Daniel J. Sorin Dept. of Electrical and Computer Engineering Duke University sorin@ee.duke.edu multithreaded system, the machine must also be able to detect and correct errors in its shared memory system, including errors in the cache coherence protocol. Whereas we can efficiently detect errors in data storage and transmission using error codes, it is far more difficult to ensure the correct execution of a complex, distributed coherence protocol with multiple interacting controllers. To provide comprehensive, end-to-end error detection, recent research has explored online (dynamic) checking of cache coherence. A coherence checker can either operate stand-alone [5, 4] or as an integral part of an online memory consistency checker [12, 13] that also detects errors in the interactions between the memory system and the processor cores. Once a coherence checker detects an error, the system can recover to a prefault state using one of several existing recovery mechanisms [19, 14] . Coherence checking is a powerful error detection mechanism, but existing coherence checkers are costly to implement, introduce high interconnection network traffic overhead, and do not scale well to large systems. These costs and limitations preclude their use in low-cost commodity systems.
In this work, we develop the Token Coherence Signature Checker (TCSC), which is a low-cost, scalable alternative to prior cache coherence checkers. It can be used by itself to detect memory system errors, or it can be used as part of a memory consistency checker [12, 13] . With TCSC, every cache and memory controller maintains a signature that represents its recent history of cache coherence events. Periodically, these signatures are gathered at a verifier which determines if an error has occurred. The cost advantages of signature-based error detection come at the expense of an arbitrarily small (but non-zero) probability of undetected errors. This paper makes three main contributions: * TCSC is the first signature-based scheme that completely checks cache coherence and can detect all types of coherence errors with arbitrarily high probability. The use of signatures significantly lowers hardware costs and interconnection network traffic compared to previous coherence checkers.
* TCSC is the first coherence checker that scales to large systems. TCSC has a constant hardware cost per memory and cache controller that is independent of cache and memory size and the number of nodes in the system. TCSC's interconnection network bandwidth overhead has a constant upper bound and never exceeds 7% in our experiments. * TCSC applies to both snooping and directory protocols, and it is the first checker of any kindfor Token
Coherence [111.
In Section 2 we introduce TCSC in the context of online checking of Token Coherence [11] . In Section 3 we show how the TCSC mechanism can be applied to any invalidation-based snooping or directory coherence protocol by reinterpreting the protocol in terms of Token Coherence. We discuss implementation issues in Section 4. Section 5 analyzes TCSC's error detection capabilities. Section 6 evaluates the hardware costs and interconnection network bandwidth overhead of TCSC. In Section 7 we compare TCSC to related work in coherence checking. We conclude in Section 8.
Token Coherence Signature
The abstract idea of TCSC is to compute two signatures at every node (i.e., every memory controller and cache controller) for each block the node has held. One signature represents the history of cache coherence states, and the other represents the history of data values. Every [11] is a low latency cache coherence protocol for unordered interconnects. Like traditional snooping and directory protocols, TC enforces the single-writer/multiple-reader property. However, instead of block states and transition rules, TC uses the following four invariants to coordinate cache accesses:
(1) At all times, each block has T tokens in the system, one of which is the owner token. (2) A processor can write a block if it holds all T tokens for that block. (3) A processor can read a block if it holds at least one token for that block. (4) If a coherence message contains the owner token it must contain data.
These invariants have been formally proven to guarantee coherence in the fault-free scenario [3] , and their simplicity makes them attractive for online checking. Each cache controller can locally check Invariants 2 and 3 by performing a redundant token check for every load and store. Nodes can also locally check Invariant 4 when receiving coherence messages. However, nodes cannot independently check Invariant 1, because it describes a global property of the system.
Rather than checking Invariant 1 directly, it is equivalent and more efficient to check changes in the token counts (for both owner and non-owner tokens) rather than the absolute number of tokens held. In all further discussion, we use T to represent either the number of owner tokens per block (T=To=1) or the number of non-owner tokens per block (T=TN), and we replace Invariant 1 with three sub-invariants: (la) Initially, there are T tokens for block B in the system.
(lb) A node can never hold less than 0 or more than T tokens for block B.
(1c) If a node sends (receives) Nt tokens for block B at time t, then another node must receive (send) the same number of tokens Nt for block B at the same time t.
Invariant Ic assumes instantaneous transfers of tokens between nodes, although in practice tokens spend non-zero time in transit. To satisfy the invariant despite these latencies, we consider the receiving node to possess the tokens during the entire transmission. To accurately account for the transmission time in its token history, the receiver must know when the tokens were sent. For this purpose, nodes timestamp each token-carrying outgoing message with the time t of sending.
When we mention tokens being sent at a given "time", we are referring to the logical time at which this event occurs. For purposes of TCSC, logical time can be any time base that respects causality and one additional constraint: it allows a node to send or receive only a single message per logical time step. We will discuss the details of how we maintain logical time in Section 4.1. Periodically, every node sends these two token signatures (for owner and non-owner tokens) to a central verifier. If the verifier determines that the signatures for both owner and non-owner tokens sum to zero, then the number of tokens for B in the system must be constant for any time t included in the signature. To ensure that B's state was updated correctly, a node does not obtain Nt directly from the message, but instead computes it by comparing the number of tokens held before and after processing the message.
As presented thus far, there are two challenges in implementing this scheme: coordination of signature collection and signature growth. Collecting signatures from all nodes is easiest to coordinate by transmitting signatures at regular intervals. However, because token receivers use the timestamps on incoming messages to update their signatures, a node must not send its signature to the verifier until it has received all messages sent to it before the collection time. For this purpose, we add a grace period after each collection time during which the nodes wait for in-flight messages to arrive. During the grace period, token events that occur after the collection time are recorded in a secondary signature, because they must not affect the signature that will be sent during collection. Once the original signature is sent to the verifier, the new collection time is determined and the secondary signature becomes the new primary. This scheme is guaranteed to be correct only if no message lingers in the interconnect longer than the grace period. Thus, the grace period specifies a fixed time limit for message delivery, and false positives (detections of "errors" that did not occur) can occur if delivery takes too long. This is not a major issue for two reasons. First, we expect the checking intervals to be orders of magnitude larger than the average delivery time, and the grace periods can be as long as the checking interval or longer if we use more than one secondary signature. Second, a severe delay in message delivery can legitimately be considered a fault. Any checking scheme that does not limit the maximum message delivery time will also be unable to detect dropped messages, because dropping a message is equivalent to an arbitrarily long delay.
The second implementation challenge is that storage required for the sum computed in TCStoken(B) grows by log2(T+1) bits at every token transfer and quickly becomes very large. Because no lossless compression scheme can guarantee a smaller signature or bound the growth to a fixed size, we use hashing to map the original unbounded signature to a smaller, fixed size set of numbers. To be able to check signatures by summing them, the hash of a sum of two signatures must be easy to compute from the sum of the signature's hashes. Fortunately a simple modulo computation suffices:
With this modification the signature size is now constant, but multiple distinct token histories can potentially result in the same signature and lead to false negatives (undetected errors). However, with a sufficiently large n, the probability of false negatives can be made arbitrarily small. However, today's CPUs typically use fewer than 64 bits for physical addresses and thus a modest 64-bit checksum will be sufficient to avoid address hashing.
Data Propagation Signature
Up to this point, all of our detection efforts focused on checking coherence states, but to truly check coherence our mechanism must also check data propagation. To clarify, we extend Invariants 2 and 3. (2') A processor can write a block if it holds all T tokens for that block. Between receiving the Tth token and the first write to the block, it must contain data identical to the data after the last write by the previous owner (3') A processor can read a block if it holds at least one token and holds data identical to the data at the block's 
Implementation Issues
Signature computation does not require complex structures, occurs off the critical path, is latency tolerant, and needs to be performed only at interconnect speed rather than CPU speed. These factors make the implementation of TCSC simple and cheap, but some care is still needed to avoid unnecessary hardware costs and performance penalties. We describe the implementation of logical time (Section 4.1), the addition of PUTS requests to an existing coherence protocol (Section 4.2), and the implementations of signature computation (Section 4.3) and signature verification (Section 4.4).
Implementing Logical Time
TCSC requires a discrete time base to order its histories of token transfers and data transfers. We use logical time, which is a time base that is both causal and locally monotonically increasing in physical time. Similar to Lamport's original logical time base [8] , all nodes maintain a local clock counter and timestamp all outgoing messages that contain data or transfer access permissions. Clocks are updated according to two rules. First, upon sending or receiving a message, increase the clock by one. Second, if a message is received with a timestamp greater than the local time, set the clock to the message timestamp plus one and consider the message to be received at the updated time. The cost of implementing this time base is the addition of a short (16-bit) timestamp to the message header. TCSC already requires this field in the header for accounting of tokens and therefore providing logical time has no extra cost. TCSC does not timestamp request messages but only token-carrying messages, because the coherence invariants address only how or when tokens move between nodes, not how or when those movements were initiated. Thus, the time of requests is irrelevant for checking the invariants.
For systems with snooping coherence, we use an optimized logical time scheme in which every node increments its logical time whenever it observes a broadcast coherence request. Token transfers between nodes happen instantaneously, because the sender of a broadcast request and all destinations see the request at the same logical time. This effect makes message timestamps unnecessary, leading to reduced overhead.
Optimizing Shared Writebacks
TCSC disallows silent evictions of cache blocks. Thus, evictions of Shared blocks which are generally silent for snooping and directory protocols now require PUTS transactions that increase interconnect traffic and controller occupancy. However, we minimize this overhead by piggy-backing each PUTS onto a subsequent coherence request to the same home node. A PUTS of block A is issued only when block A is evicted from the cache, which occurs only after a miss to another block, B, that maps to the same cache set. Thus, the PUTS of A is immediately followed by a Get-Shared (GETS) or Get-Exclusive (GETX) coherence request for B. Both the PUTS and GET (either GETS or GETX) pertain to the same cache set and thus have a large number of common address bits. Hence, we can piggy-back the PUTS onto the GET in systems in which (a) all bits used to select the block's home node are also used to select the cache set, or (b) all requests are broadcast. Most CPUs use the least significant bits (above the block offset bits) for set selection. Using bits above the set selection bits for home node selection is only necessary for large numbers of nodes or very coarse interleaving of addresses mapping to different nodes, both of which are uncommon. For example, in an 8-node system with a 2MB 4-way cache, any interleaving of 64KB or finer will allow piggy-backing. With piggy-backing, the PUTS does not require a separate message header and needs to hold only the address bits not among the common bits. In our simulated system, this reduces the cost of a PUTS from 8 bytes (4 header+4 address) to 3 bytes (address-8 shared bits) added to the GET.
We can further reduce the bandwidth used by PUTS messages by piggy-backing an implicit PUTS onto the GET request. Instead of sending the address of the block that was evicted, we send the cache way of the evicted block and let the directory determine the address. To make this optimization work, the memory controller 
Implementing Signature Verification
The signature verifier is a centralized component and could be a potential bottleneck. In small systems, this is not an issue, because signature collections are infrequent and do not cause large amounts of traffic. In large systems, multiple verifiers, interleaved by address range or time interval, can be used to avoid contention for the network links near a central verifier. To further increase scalability, signatures can be aggregated for groups of nodes by adding the signatures locally and sending their sum to the verifier. Aggregation can also be done hierarchically to scale to extremely large systems.
The duration of the verification interval in TCSC is not resource-constrained because all storage requirements and computation times are constant. Verification intervals must be shorter than the recovery period of the checkpoint mechanism used, but can otherwise be chosen freely. In general, short verification intervals will slightly increase bandwidth consumption due to more frequent signature collections and shorten the grace period for delayed messages. Long verification intervals increase the probability of multiple error scenarios.
Analysis of Error Detection Capabilities
The signature hashing we use to obtain a constant size signature can lead to aliasing, i.e., two distinct token histories mapping to the same signature. Aliasing can cause false negatives (undetected errors), but we can minimize this probability by choosing the signature constants n and T appropriately. We discuss the only four single error scenarios possible in TCSC: a transaction with incorrect token count, incorrect time, incorrect address, or incorrect data. All low-level single errors manifest themselves as one of these scenarios. Because errors in the address or data are detected using the same equation as errors in token transfers, we discuss only two scenarios in detail: incorrect token count and incorrect time.
For the first scenario, assume that an error causes a node at time t to record the arrival or departure of Nt' tokens when Nt tokens were actually transferred, thus violating Invariant 1. In a single error scenario, only the summands for time t, Nt (T + 1)t and N't (T+ 1)t, differ between the computed signature and the signature for the error-free scenario. Thus, a false negative occurs only if Nt (T+ 1)t mod n = N't (T+ 1)t mod n .We can rewrite this as (N's Ne) (T+ 1) mod n = 0 or 3k: (N't-N) (T+ I)t= (k n). A simple divisibility argument shows that this will never be the case if we choose T and n such that T+1 and n are coprime. The right side of the equation is obviously divisible by n; therefore the left side must also be divisible by n to satisfy the equation. Because (T+1) and n are coprime, no factors of (T+1)t and n cancel out and therefore (N't -N) must be divisible by n. Because (N't -N) . (T+ I)t t mod n = 1. By setting c=(T+1) and e=t-t', e we obtain the equation c mod n = 1 . The smallest such e is called the multiplicative order of c modulo n. The multiplicative order of (T+1) mod n therefore determines the smallest value of (t-t') that can lead to a false negative, i.e., the maximum time shift that is guaranteed to be detected. If we choose n such that the multiplicative order of (T+1) mod n is larger than the checking intervals, TCSC detects any single delayed transfer.
In our experiments we used n=264, T=#processors 
Analysis of Multiple Error Detection
When multiple errors occur during a checking interval, there is a non-zero probability that TCSC will not detect them. For any given multiple error scenario (e.g., two corrupted messages), detectability depends on the exact history of token transactions during the checking interval. The exact probability of false negatives depends on the error distribution in the system, but for a large number of uniformly distributed incorrect token transactions it converges to n-1.
Experimental Validation
In addition to this analytical evaluation of error coverage and error detection latency, we also experimentally tested TCSC's error detection capabilities using the simulation infrastructure and benchmarks described in Section 6. We randomly injected various errors corrupted, dropped, rerouted and duplicated messages, incorrect cache transitions, corrupted cache state into the system and continued simulation until the next signature collection was complete. TCSC detected all errors and the detection latency was about half the checking interval, as expected. It is infeasible to experimentally evaluate the probability of undetected errors because, for reasonably large signatures (64-bits or more), undetected errors are so infrequent that they would require extremely long simulation runs to be measurable. We do not experimentally evaluate error detection latency, because it is determined entirely by the frequency at which the signatures are collected.
Evaluation
We now evaluate TCSC in terms of its impact on interconnection network traffic (Section 6.1), performance (Section 6.2), and hardware cost (Section 6.3).
Interconnection Bandwidth Overhead
Interconnection network bandwidth overhead is the most important cost of TCSC, because it affects system cost and performance overhead. We first present a theoretical analysis of the worst-case bandwidth overheads. and then compare them to experimental results.
Worst-Case Analysis
TCSC has a bounded worst-case overhead per coherence transaction that depends on the coherence protocol. A coherence transaction comprises all of the messages required to obtain access to a block and dispose of it later. The minimum costs for obtaining access consist of a GET request and the transfer of the data itself. The cost of disposing a block can include a PUT request or the cost of the Invalidate request received by the sharer and the following acknowledgment. All computations assume the same 64-byte blocks and 8-byte headers used in our simulations. Token Coherence. TCSC's overhead is caused by the 2-byte timestamp on every token-carrying message (Data, PUT, and Ack). Every coherence transaction involves exactly two token-carrying messages one to receive the tokens and one to give them away for a total of 4 bytes. The worst case overhead is therefore 4/(size of smallest transaction). A minimum transaction requires a GET request, data transfer, and PUTS request, totalling 8+72+8=88 bytes in a system without TCSC. Thus, the worst case overhead is 4/88 (4.54%). Snooping. No timestamps are added to the messages and all bandwidth overhead is caused by PUTS messages. The worst case is a PUTS in every transaction, and the worst-case overhead is (size of PUTS)/(size of minimum transaction). Determining the size of a transaction is problematic because it involves broadcast requests and therefore depends on the network topology. Because PUTS requests are not broadcast and therefore not affected by topology, a physically shared bus with "free" broadcasts maximizes TCSC's snooping overhead and will be used as basis for this computation. A minimum transaction consists of a GET request and the data message, requiring a total of 80 bytes to be transferred in a system without TCSC. A single PUTS requires an 8-byte message and causes a worst-case overhead of 8/80 or 10%. Piggy-backing of PUTS requests decreases the worst-case overhead to 5%. Directory. Directory protocols require both additional PUTS messages and timestamps on several messages. Consequently they have a worst-case overhead of 12/80 or about 15%, which is larger than the worst case for snooping or TC. Piggy-backing of PUTS requests decreases worst-case overhead to 10%.
TCSC requires additional bandwidth to transmit signatures from the different nodes to the signature verifier. This happens so infrequently that the additional traffic is negligible compared to the overheads described above. Because both of our logical time bases increment time based on message transmissions, a fixed minimum number of messages and bytes is guaranteed to be transmitted between signature collections. Our simulated 8- processor systems (TC, snooping, and directory) have a worst case 0.072% overhead for signature collection.
Experimental Evaluation
This section describes simulation experiments we performed to determine TCSC's bandwidth overheads for various system configurations. We used a modified version of the GEMS simulation toolkit [9] that accurately models the timing of the processors, coherence protocols, etc., of the 8-node multiprocessor systems described in Table 2 . Our benchmarks are several commercial applications from the Wisconsin Commercial Workload Suite [1] . To handle the natural variability in multithreaded workloads, we simulated each system configuration ten times. Error bars in our figures represent 95% confidence intervals.
TCSC's bandwidth overhead depends on the sizes of the timestamps and cache blocks used. Because TCSC Figure 6 . TCSC overhead vs. L2 cache size Figure 5 shows that TCSC has no statistically significant impact on the number of coherence transactions. TCSC's total bandwidth overhead is the product of the number of transactions and the per-transaction overhead. The standard deviation of this product is larger than the expected TCSC overhead, which would make the overhead difficult to quantify accurately. Therefore, we use the more stable overhead-per-transaction metric for all bandwidth overhead figures. Figure 6 shows the impact of L2 cache size on TCSC's per-transaction bandwidth overhead. As expected, the overheads for snooping and directory decrease with larger caches, because PUTS requests are less frequent due to fewer capacity misses. For TC, where PUTS requests are also necessary without TCSC, there is still a slight downward trend, because the relative number of high-overhead GETS-PUTS transactions compared to other transactions is reduced. Figure 7 shows TCSC's ability to scale to systems with varying numbers of processors. For snooping and TC, the relative TCSC per-transaction overhead drops when we add more processors to the system, because both of these protocols use broadcast requests that cause overall transaction costs to rise whereas the per-transaction cost for TCSC remains constant. This effect is not present in directory, which has similar overhead for all configurations. Although the scalability experiments were limited to 16-processor systems by the simulation environment, these results along with the worst-case analysis indicate that TCSC can scale to larger systems.
Finally we assess the message processing overhead at the memory controllers due to PUTS messages, assuming for now no offloading of PUTS processing to the TCS unit. Figure 8 shows the request throughput at the memory controllers (normalized to Unprotected) for snooping and directory. TC is not shown because PUTS messages already exist in the base protocol. In our simulated system, even the maximum overhead of 30% did enables simple hardware implementations. Within the constraints discussed in Section 5, we can freely choose the constant n and the number of tokens per block (as long as the number of tokens per block is greater than or equal to the maximum number of sharers). Therefore, the constant TN is only required to be greater than or equal to the number of possible sharers. Thus, we can use cheap bit manipulations (bit-shift for exponentiation or bit-wise AND for modulus) for one of the two computations by picking either (T+1) or n to be a power of two. Because the two constants must be coprime, we cannot pick both of them to be powers of two. If n is not a power of two, we can choose it to be a Mersenne or similar number that allows efficient modulo computations [6] . If n is a Mersenne number, signature updates require a total of just one variable shift and two additions. If (T+1) is not a power of two, we exploit that t is monotonically increasing and we can compute the (T+1)t term using the result from the previous timestep by a simple multiplication. If T is a power of two, a multiplication by T+1 requires only a constant shift and an addition. Thus, a signature update requires a constant shift, one multiplication, and two additions. Signature verification is done using additions and a comparison against zero, neither of which require complex circuitry.
For snooping protocols and directory protocols that do not maintain full sharer bitmasks, the largest cost is storage space for tracking the number of sharers for each block at the memory controller. In most memory controllers, TCSC 
Related Work in Coherence Checking
Several authors have previously developed implementable checkers for cache coherence. The novelty of TCSC lies in its very low implementation costs, its ability to detect all coherence violations, and its applicability to a wide range of coherence protocols.
Sorin et al. [18] dynamically verify invariants in snooping systems using signatures computed locally and checked periodically at a centralized checker similar to TCSC. These invariants are necessary but not sufficient for coherence. The scheme requires bandwidth for checksum exchanges (<1% overhead) and uses a checksum that is simpler to compute than TCSC. The low overhead is achieved by exploiting properties of snooping protocols, which prevents the mechanism from being applied to other types of protocols, and by sacrificing error coverage. Whereas TCSC can detect errors of any kind with high probability and will detect every single error, Sorin et al.'s scheme is unable to detect certain kinds of errors (e.g., errors caused by operations that are performed correctly but at the wrong time or in the wrong order) and there is no guarantee that even single errors will be detected.
Cantin et al. [5] dynamically verify coherence by replaying transitions between stable states on redundant checker circuits after a transaction completes. This scheme is also limited to snooping protocols and it requires replication of the cache line state information. Thus, the storage requirement is linearly dependent on the cache size, rather than fixed as for TCSC. They add a dedicated snooping bus for verification and do not give bandwidth overhead numbers. To compare it to TCSC, we measured the bandwidth required to replay all requests necessary for full error coverage in the simulated system used for TCSC evaluation. Request replay causes about 20% overhead on average; this is twice the TCSC worst-case overhead and nearly 10 times the observed TCSC overhead for snooping. Unlike TCSC, the verification traffic is broadcast, which limits scalability, and verification of payload data is not addressed.
Our prior work [12, 13] uses coherence checking as part of a mechanism to check memory consistency. DVCC, the coherence checker in that work, causes a 20%-30% increase in interconnect traffic for both directory and snooping protocols in a system comparable to the one used here. Like TCSC, all verification messages are unicast and the payload is verified using checksums. DVCC requires additional verification state for each block and thus storage cost grows with cache size. In our simulated system, storage for DVCC totals about 128KB per cache and 192KB per memory controller.
Conclusions
TCSC is a comprehensive error detection mechanism for coherent memory systems, and it has much lower implementation costs than previous schemes. The additional hardware is simple, small in area, and not timingcritical. The worst-case bandwidth overhead is in the 5% to 10% range, but simulation results show that actual overhead is even smaller. The results also show that the bandwidth overhead is significantly less than in existing verification mechanisms: about five to ten times less for a snooping protocol and four to five times less for a directory protocol. No comparable mechanism had previously been proposed for Token Coherence.
These factors make TCSC a compelling option to vastly increase a system's error detection capability without sacrificing cost or performance. The applicability of TCSC is not limited to the hardware coherence mechanisms discussed in this paper, but also includes software DSM systems which often exhibit higher error rates due to less reliable interconnect networks.
